We consider identi…cation of nonparametric random utility models of multinomial choice using "micro data,"i.e., observation of the characteristics and choices of individual consumers. Our model of preferences nests random coe¢ cients discrete choice models widely used in practice with parametric functional form and distributional assumptions. However, the model is nonparametric and distribution free. It allows choicespeci…c unobservables, endogenous choice characteristics, unknown heteroskedasticity, and high-dimensional correlated taste shocks. Under standard "large support"and instrumental variables assumptions, we show identi…ability of the random utility model. We demonstrate robustness of these results to relaxation of the large support condition and show that when it is replaced with a weaker "common choice probability" condition, the demand structure is still identi…ed. We show that key maintained hypotheses are testable.
Introduction
We consider identi…cation of nonparametric random utility models of multinomial choice using "micro data," i.e., observation of the characteristics and choices of individual consumers. Our model of preferences nests random coe¢ cients discrete choice models widely used in practice with parametric functional form and distributional assumptions. However, the model is nonparametric and distribution free. It allows choice-speci…c unobservables, endogenous choice characteristics, unknown heteroskedasticity, and high-dimensional correlated taste shocks. Under standard "large support"and instrumental variables assumptions, we show identi…ability of the random utility model, i.e., of (i) the choice-speci…c unobservables and (ii) the joint distribution of preferences conditional on any vector of observed and unobserved characteristics. We demonstrate robustness of these results to relaxation of the large support condition and show that when it is replaced with a weaker "common choice probability"condition (de…ned below), the demand structure is still identi…ed. We also show that key maintained hypotheses are testable.
Motivating our work is the extensive use of discrete choice models of demand for di¤eren-tiated goods in a wide range of applied …elds of economics and related disciplines. Examples include transportation and urban economics (e.g., Domencich and McFadden (1975) ), industrial organization (e.g., Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995) ), international trade (e.g., Goldberg (1995) ), marketing (e.g., Guadagni and Little (1983) ), education (e.g., Manski and Wise (1983) ), migration (e.g., Schultz (1982) ), voting (e.g., Poole and Rosenthal (1985) ), and health economics (e.g., Capps, Dranove, and Satterthwaite (2003) ). We focus in particular on models in the spirit of Berry (1994) , Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995, 2004) , Nevo (2001) , Petrin (2002) and a large related literature. These models combine two essential features: heterogeneous tastes for choice characteristics, and endogeneity through market/choice-speci…c unobservables. Although this class of models is used in a wide range of applications, their identi…cation has not been addressed in the prior literature. Without an understanding of the sources of identi…cation in these models, it is di¢ cult to know what quali…cations are necessary when interpreting estimates or policy conclusions.
Our analysis demonstrates that with su¢ ciently rich micro data, random utility multinomial choice models featuring unobserved market/choice characteristics are identi…ed without the parametric or distributional assumptions used in practice-typically, linear utility with independent additive and/or multiplicative taste shocks drawn from parametrically speci…ed distributions. Our results may therefore lead to greater con…dence in estimates and policy conclusions obtained in empirical work based on discrete choice models. In particular, parametric speci…cations used in estimation can often be viewed as parsimonious approximations in …nite samples rather than as essential maintained assumptions. We view this as our primary message. However, our results also suggest that with large samples even richer speci…cations (parametric or nonparametric) of preferences might be considered in empirical work, and our identi…cation proofs may suggest estimation approaches.
An important strategy in our work is modeling utility as a nonparametric random function of observed and unobserved characteristics. This contrasts with the usual approach of building up randomness from random coe¢ cients and/or other taste shocks. Our formulation not only enables us to consider a very general model of preference heterogeneity, but also leads us to focus directly on identi…cation of the conditional joint distribution of utilities. The advantage of this approach might be unexpected: a natural intuition is that added structure on the way randomness enters the model would aid identi…cation. However, whereas the conditional distribution of utilities has the same dimension as the observable conditional choice probabilities (i.e., the dimension of the choice set), even the standard linear random coe¢ cients model will involve taste shocks of larger dimension unless signi…cant restrictions are placed on the correlation structure. Focusing directly on the joint distribution of utilities naturally leads to primitives whose dimension exactly matches the dimension of the observables without imposing strong distributional or functional form restrictions.
A second key aspect of our work is our explicit modeling of market/choice-speci…c unobservables. Although this is standard in the applied literature, much of the prior work on identi…cation of discrete choice models has embedded the sources of preference heterogeneity and the sources of endogeneity in the same random variables. In applications to demand estimation, an endogeneity problem typically arises because some observed choice characteristics (price being a leading example) depend on unobserved choice characteristics. For such environments, explicitly modeling market/choice-speci…c unobservables enables one to de…ne counterfactuals involving exogenous changes in endogenous characteristics within a model of heteroskedastic random utilities. For example, our formulation allows characterization of demand elasticities, which require evaluating the e¤ects of a change in price (including resulting changes in the variance or other moments of random utilities), holding unobserved product characteristics …xed.
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A third novel component of our work is its exploration of both identi…cation of the full model and identi…cation of "demand,"i.e., the mapping from observed and unobserved characteristics to the vector of choice probabilities. For many questions motivating estimation of discrete choice models, knowledge of this demand structure su¢ ces. Not surprisingly, identi…cation of demand can be obtained under weaker conditions than those giving full identi…cation of the random utility model. Despite these di¤erences from the prior literature, we rely heavily on two standard ideas.
One is the use of variation in exogenous observables to "trace out" the distribution of unobservables. Antecedents in the discrete choice literature include Manski (1985) , Matzkin (1992 Matzkin ( , 1993 , Lewbel (2000) , Honoré and Lewbel (2002) , and Briesch, Chintagunta, and Matzkin (2005) , among others. We show that this strategy is particularly useful in a micro data setting, where one can exploit variation in individual-level observables within a market, holding market-level unobservables …xed. As usual, we require the observables tracing out the joint distribution to have dimension as large as the choice set. However, we show that the support conditions commonly used with this strategy can be substantially relaxed without losing identi…cation of demand. A second standard idea is the use of exogenous variation in choice sets to decompose variation in the distribution of utilities into the contributions of observed and unobserved characteristics. This strategy has been exploited in parametric discrete choice models by, e.g., Berry (1994) and Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995, 2004 ).
Here we rely heavily on results from the recent literature on nonparametric identi…cation of regression models using instrumental variables, particularly Newey and Powell (2003) and Chernozhukov and Hansen (2005) . To our knowledge, the applicability of these results to discrete choice settings has not been previously exploited. An implication of our results is that the primary requirement for identi…cation of demand is the availability of instruments.
As discussed below, one advantage of micro data is the variety of instruments that may be available.
In the following section we provide some additional discussion of related literature. We then set up the choice framework and de…ne the observables and structural features of interest in section 3. Section 4 provides an illustration of key lines of argument in a simple case: binary choice with exogenous characteristics. Section 5 addresses full identi…cation in the case of multinomial choice with endogeneity. There we consider two alternative instrumental variables conditions that deliver full identi…cation of the model. In section 6 we show identi…ability of demand under weaker support conditions and illustrate the robustness of the full identi…cation results to the relaxation of the large support assumption (cf. Chamberlain (2010) ). Section 7 discusses testable restrictions of key maintained hypotheses. In section 8 we show how our results can be reinterpreted to show identi…cation in one type of environment in which only market level data are available. We conclude in section 9.
Relation to the Literature
Our work is motivated by a large applied literature using models of discrete choice demand incorporating two key components: heterogeneous preferences for choice characteristics and endogeneity through market/choice-speci…c unobservables. The former allows a ‡exible model of substitution patterns (e.g., cross-elasticities), 2 while the latter is essential if one is to control for the classical endogeneity of prices. Although there is a large literature on identi…cation of discrete choice models, 3 there has been no analysis that covers even the linear version of these models typically used in the applied literature. Thus, although we relax functional form restrictions considered in the prior identi…cation literature, a more fundamental distinction is that our model allows simultaneously for heterogeneity in preferences for choice characteristics and endogeneity through market/choice-speci…c unobservables.
Identi…cation of heterogeneous preferences for choice characteristics has been explored by Ichimura and Thompson (1998) and Briesch, Chintagunta, and Matzkin (2005 and both impose restrictions we do not require on how heterogeneity enters preferences.
Lewbel (2000) considered identi…cation in the semi-parametric linear random utility model
where the distribution of ij can vary with x ij . Unlike (1), our model makes a distinction between the unobservables responsible for taste heterogeneity and those responsible for endogeneity.
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To see why this is essential in applications to discrete choice demand, suppose we wish to describe how quantities would change in response to an exogenous change in the price of good j-e.g., to describe own-and cross-price demand elasticities. Accounting for heterogeneity in tastes requires that the entire distribution of v ij (not just its mean) be permitted to change with the change in price. At the same time, controlling for the endogeneity of price requires that all else (in particular, market/product-level unobservables that are correlated with price) be held …xed. Meeting both requirements is not possible include those in Quandt (1966) , Quandt (1968) , and Domencich and McFadden (1975) .
in a model like (1) that has a single "composite" error term. Thus, while (1) provides an attractive structure if the parameter is the object of interest, the model lacks the structure needed to de…ne key objects of interest in the context of discrete choice demand. Honoré and Lewbel (2002) consider a binary panel version of the model in Lewbel (2000) , relying on linearity in a composite error term and focusing on identi…cation of a slope parameter. Altonji and Matzkin (2005) consider a similar but nonparametric model. Their results for discrete choice models focus on identi…cation and estimation only of local average responses. Other work considering models similar to (1) includes Hong and Tamer (2004) , Blundell and Powell (2004) , Lewbel (2005) , and Magnac and Maurin (2007) .
Matzkin (2004) Matzkin (2007a Matzkin ( , 2007b .
6 See also Lewbel (2000) , Honoré and Lewbel (2002) , Altonji and Matzkin (2005) , and Petrin and Train (2009) . 7 Gautier and Kitamura (2007) have considered binary choice in a linear random coe¢ cients environment. They include a brief discussion of endogeneity under a triangular structure.
Although the results there extend immediately to the richer micro data environment considered in the present paper, here our focus is on the gains that micro data can deliver. The lack of micro data in Berry and Haile (2009a) makes it impossible to exploit the within-market variation that plays a central role throughout the present paper. Consequently, the results in Berry and Haile (2009a) additive structure in a micro data environment, allowing for heterogeneous preferences and endogeneity through choice-speci…c unobservables. They use a change of variables approach more closely related to one of the approaches we have developed in Berry and Haile (2009a) .
Model

Preferences and Choices
Consistent with the motivation from demand estimation, we describe the model as one in which each consumer i in each market t chooses from a set J t of available products. We will use the terms "product," "good," and "choice" interchangeably to refer to elements of the choice set. The term "market"is synonymous with the choice set. In particular, consumers facing the same choice set are de…ned to be in the same market. In practice, markets will typically be de…ned geographically and/or temporally. Variation in the choice set will of course be essential to identi…cation, and our explicit reference to markets provides a way to discuss this clearly.
Each consumer i in market t is associated with a matrix of observables z it = (z i1t ; : : : ; z iJtt ).
The j subscript on z ijt allows the possibility that some characteristics are both consumer-and choice-speci…c. This can result from interactions between consumer characteristics and product characteristics, or from measures that are inherently consumer/choice-speci…c. Examples from the literature include interactions between family size and automobile size (Goldberg (1995) , Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (2004) ), distance from an individual's home to a hospital, school, or retailer (Capps, Dranove, and Satterthwaite (2003) , Hastings, Staiger, and Kane (2007) , Burda, Harding, and Hausman (2008) ), household exposure to product-speci…c advertising (Ackerberg (2001) ), matches between a voter's position and party a¢ liation and those of each candidate (Rivers (1988) ), and matches between the income, education and race of a household to that of a neighborhood (Bayer, Ferreira, and McMillan (2007) ). We will require one such measure for each market t and each product j 1.
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In applications to demand it is important to model consumers as having the option to purchase none of the products the researcher focuses on. 10 We represent this by choice j = 0 and assume 0 2 J t 8t. Choice 0 is often referred to as the "outside good." We denote the number of "inside goods" by J t = jJ t j 1. 11 Observables (to us) at the level of the good and/or market are denoted by x jt . Among other things, x jt can include product dummies and price. Let x t = (x 1t ; : : : ; x Jtt ). Unobservables at the level of the product and/or market are characterized by a scalar jt (z it ) for each j; t; z it . This may re ‡ect unobserved choice characteristics, unobserved market characteristics, and/or unobserved taste for choice j in market t. Although we follow the literature in restricting jt (z it ) to be a scalar, we permit it to vary across subpopulations with di¤erent z it : 12 For simplicity we will assume that jt (z it ) has an atomless marginal distribution in the population for all z it .
We consider preferences represented by a random utility model. Letting denote the support of x jt ; jt (z it ) ; z ijt , each consumer i in market t has a conditional indirect utility function u it : ! R. However, consumers have heterogeneous tastes, even conditional on observables. Thus, from the perspective of the researcher, each utility function u it can be viewed as a random draw from a set U of permissible functions fu : ! Rg :
More formally, let ( ; F; P) denote a probability space. Given any x jt ; jt (z it ) ; z ijt 2 ,
where ! it 2 , and u is measurable in ! it . The realization of ! it determines the utility function of consumer i in market t. The draw ! it from the sample space is independent of the arguments of the utility function; i.e., the probability measure P does not depend on x jt ; jt (z it ) ; z ijt . This is without loss of generality, since the function u permits the distribution of u it x jt ; jt (z it ) ; z ijt to vary arbitrarily with x jt ; jt (z it ) ; z ijt . P also does not vary with the market index t. This re ‡ects our earlier assumption that all unobserved choice/market-level heterogeneity is captured by jt (z it ). We discuss testable implications below.
Let
We emphasize that ! it is not a random variable (or random vector) but an elementary event in the sample space . The realization of ! it could determine the realizations of any number of number of random variables with arbitrary joint distribution. As one example, consider mapping our general model to a more familiar special case:
Example 1. Consider the linear random coe¢ cients random utility model
below we derive a testable implication that does.
Here jt (z it ) = jt and the random variables
it ; : : : ;
it ; i1t ; : : : ; iJtt can be de…ned on the probability space ( ; F; P), for example as
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This speci…cation permits an arbitrary joint distribution of
( 1) it ; : : : ;
it ; i1t ; : : : ; iJtt but requires that it be the same for all t and x jt ; jt ; z ijt j=1:::Jt .
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This speci…cation of
it ; f ijt g j relaxes standard assumptions in the literature but is still more restrictive than we require, even within a linear random coe¢ cients model. For example, recalling that x t can include product dummies, a more general model is obtained by letting it = (
(1) (z it ; ! it ) ; : : : ; (K) (z it ; ! it )) and ijt = x jt ; jt ; ! it . We could generalize further by specifying ijt = x jt ; jt (z it ) ; z ijt ; ! it ; however, then the sum x jt it + z ijt + jt in (3) would be redundant and the model would collapse to our fully general formulation (2).
Aside from the restriction to scalar market/choice-speci…c unobservables, our representation of preferences is so far fully general. However, all of our results will require a restriction on the set U of permissible utility functions. Let
it denote the vector z (1)
where the function~ is strictly increasing in its second argument, and the random coe¢ cient it = (! it ) is strictly positive with with probability one.
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This imposes three restrictions:
Part (i) requires one component of z it whose variation is not confounded with variation in the 13 We can write choice-speci…c functions such as j ( ) because x t is permitted to include product dummies.
14 This formulation allows variation in J t across markets. For example, ! it determines the values of the random variables ijt = j (! it ) for all possible choices j, not just those in the current choice set. 15 If it < 0 w.p. 1, we replace z
ijt . As long as j it j > 0 w.p. 1, identi…cation of the sign of it is straightforward. market/choice-speci…c unobservable. While an important restriction, this relaxes the standard assumption jt (z it ) = jt 8z it . Part (ii) requires that, for each z
it , there be a monotonic transformation of utilities such that z (1) ijt enters in additively separable form. 16 With separability, the invariance of P to x jt ; z ijt ; jt (z it ) j2J -previously without loss-now has bite:
ijt , all consumers rank the possible values of
the same way. If we interpret jt z
as an unobserved product characteristic,
is a "vertical" rather than "horizontal" characteristic. We do still allow heterogeneity in preferences for jt z
, and we allow a di¤erent representation (4) for each value of z (2) it . The invariance and separability restrictions together give z
ijt the properties of a "special regressor"(e.g., Lewbel (2000) ) that will provide a mapping between units of (latent) utility and units of (observable) choice probabilities.
17 Monotonicity plays important roles as well, enabling us to map observed conditional choice probabilities to values of the market/choice unobservables. We show in section 7 that all three restrictions have testable implications.
Henceforth we condition on J t = J , with jJ j = J. We also condition on a value of z
it and suppress it in the notation. For simplicity, we will now write only z ijt and z it to 16 For binary choice, if we assume t (z it ) = t z (2) it and that u (x t ; t (z it ) ; z it ; ! it ) is strictly increasing in z
it ; ! it o . This leads to an observationally equivalent model with separability in z
it . This is well known. Nonetheless, additive separability is not without loss under these assumptions. This is because there may be no monotonic transformation of the original utility function that leads to the separable form. For example, suppose that according to u x t ; t z (2) it ; z it ; ! it the marginal rate of substitution between z it . This property would be preserved by any monotonic transformation but fails under separability. Thus, although the separable structure preserves consumers'ordinal rankings of the outside good and any inside good, it need not preserve their ordinal rankings of alternative inside goods. An implication is that there can be simultaneous changes in z (1) it and x t that would raise welfare under one model but lower welfare under the other. Nonetheless, the observational equivalence demonstrates why it may be di¢ cult to obtain full identi…cation without a restriction like the separability we assume. Note that quasilinearity also provides a cardinal representation of utility, making it possible to characterize aggregate welfare. 17 We can allow z 
it , utilities have the form v ijt = g (c ijt ) + ijt with c ijt j= ijt . If g ( ) is linear, identi…cation of g ( ) follows by standard results (e.g., Manski (1985) ). Identi…cation of nonlinear g ( ) can be obtained under restrictions considered in Matzkin (1993) . represent z (1) ijt and z (1) it , respectively. Likewise, we will write jt instead of jt z (2) it . With this simpli…ed notation, each market t is de…ned by the values of x jt ; jt j2J :
Normalizations
Before discussing identi…cation, we must have a unique representation of preferences for which the identi…cation question can be posed. This requires several normalizations.
First, because unobservables enter non-separably and have no natural units, we must normalize the location and scale of jt for each j. It will be useful to employ di¤erent normalizations for di¤erent results, so we provide these below.
We must also normalize the location and scale of utilities. Without loss, we normalize the scale of each consumer i's utility using his marginal utility from z ijt , yielding utilities with the form
; j = 1; : : : ; J:
Here we include a subscript j on the function~ j because in general we will have conditioned on a di¤erent value of z
ijt for each j. Letting
this gives the representation of preferences we will work with below:
To normalize the location we set v i0t = 0 8i; t. Treating the utility from the outside good as non-stochastic is without loss, since choices are determined by di¤erences in utilities and we have not restricted the joint distribution of utilities across products.
Observables and Structural Features of Interest
Each consumer i maximizes her utility, choosing good j whenever v ijt > v ikt 8k 2 J fjg.
For simplicity we assume that any ties with the outside good are broken in favor of the outside good. We denote consumer i's choice by
We will typically require excluded instruments, which we denote byw jt . One advantage of micro data is the variety of instrumental variables that may be available. Depending on the environment, instruments for prices 18 might include cost shifters excludable from the utility function, prices in other markets (e.g., Hausman (1996) , Nevo (2001)), characteristics of competing products (e.g., Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995)), and/or "average" values of z it in market t (e.g., Waldfogel (2003) , Gentzkow and Shapiro (2009) ).
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Because the arguments are standard, we will not discuss assumptions necessary to justify the exclusion and "rank"conditions, which we will assume directly below.
The observables then consist of the market index t and the variables (y it ; fx jt ;w jt ; z ijt g j2J ) :
To discuss identi…cation, we treat their joint distribution as known. In particular, we take the conditional probabilities
as known. Loosely speaking, we consider the case of observations from a large number of markets, each with a large number of consumers, who are anonymous conditional on z it .
Our …rst objective is to derive su¢ cient conditions for identi…cation of the market/choicespeci…c unobservables and the distribution of preferences over choices in sets J , conditional on the characteristics x jt ; z ijt ; jt j2J . In particular, we will show identi…cation of jt j2J
and the joint distribution of fv ijt g j2J conditional on any x jt ; z ijt ; jt j2J in their support.
These conditional distributions fully characterize the primitives of this model. We therefore refer to identi…cation of these probability distributions as full identi…cation of the random utility model.
We will also consider a type of partial identi…cation: identi…cation of demand. For many economic questions motivating estimation of discrete choice demand models, the joint distribution of utilities is not needed. For example, to discuss cross-price elasticities, equilibrium markups, or pricing/market shares under counterfactual ownership or cost structures, one requires identi…cation of demand, not the full random utility structure. Identi…cation of demand naturally requires less from the model and/or data than identi…cation of the distribution of preferences. Demand is fully characterized by the unobservables jt j2J and the structural choice probabilities j fx jt ; jt ; z ijt g j2J = Pr y it = jjfx jt ; jt ; z ijt g j2J :
These conditional probabilities are not directly observable from (6) because of the unobservables jt .
Illustration: Binary Choice with Exogeneity
To illustrate key elements of our approach, we begin with the simple case of binary choice with exogenous x jt . Dropping the j subscripts, consumer i selects the inside good whenever
Here we normalize t by letting it have a uniform distribution on (0; 1). We consider identi…cation under the following assumptions.
Assumption 2. supp z it jx t ; t = R 8x:
Assumption 1 merely restates that for this illustration we are considering the special case of exogenous observables. This assumption is dropped in the following section. A "large support" condition like Assumption 2 is common in the literature on nonparametric and semiparametric identi…cation of discrete choice models (e.g., Manski (1985 ), Matzkin (1992 , Matzkin (1993) , Lewbel (2000) ). 20 We relax this assumption in section 6.
Here we show that Assumptions 1 and 2 are su¢ cient for full identi…cation of the random utility model. Let it = (x t ; t ; ! it ) as shorthand. Holding the market t …xed, all variation in it is due to ! it . The observed conditional probability that a consumer chooses the outside good in market t is
Because z it and it are independent conditional on t (i.e., conditional on (x t ; t )), Assumption 2 guarantees that variation in z it within market t identi…es the distribution of it jt. Call this F it jt ( ). This argument can be repeated for all markets t.
In writing it jt, we …x the values of x t and t , although only the former is actually observed. However, once we know the distribution of it jt for all t, we can recover the value of each t as well. To see this, let for some function D that is strictly increasing in its second argument. Identi…cation of each j then follows standard arguments. In particular, for 2 (0; 1) let (x t ) denote the th quantile of t jx t across markets. Recalling the normalization of t , strict monotonicity of D in t implies
Since (x t ) is known for all x t and , D is identi…ed on fsupp x t g (0; 1). With D known, each t is known as well.
Thus far we have shown identi…cation of F it jt and of each latent t . So for any (x t ; t ) in their support, the value of
is uniquely determined for all r 2 R. Since v it = z it + (x t ; t ; ! it ), this proves the following result.
Theorem 1. Consider the binary choice setting with preferences given by (5). Under Assumptions 1 and 2, each t and the distribution of v it conditional on any (x t ; t ; z it ) 2 is identi…ed.
Our argument involved two simple steps, each standard on its own. First, we showed that variation in z it can be used to trace out the distribution of preferences across consumers. It is in this step that the role of idiosyncratic variation in tastes is identi…ed. Antecedents for this step include Matzkin (1992) , Matzkin (1993) , Lewbel (2000) . 21 Here we apply this step within each market, exploiting the fact that conditioning on the market …xes all characteristics of the choice set, even those not observed. In the second step, we use variation in choice characteristics across markets to decompose the variation in utilities across products into the variation due to observables and that due to the unobservables t . This idea has been 21 See also Matzkin (2007a Matzkin ( , 2007b .
used extensively in estimation of parametric multinomial choice demand models following Berry (1994) , Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995) , and Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (2004) .
This second step is essential once we allow the possibility of endogenous choice characteristics (e.g., correlation between price and t ), as will typically be necessary in demand estimation.
Our approach for the more general cases follows the same broad outline.
Multinomial Choice: Full Identi…cation
We now consider the general case of multinomial choice with endogenous characteristics using the speci…cation of preferences in (5). We will use the following generalization of the large support assumption:
Assumption 3. supp fz ijt g j=1;:::;J j x jt ; jt j=1;:::
This is a strong assumption, essentially requiring su¢ cient variation in (z i1t ; : : : ; z iJtt )
to move choice probabilities through the entire unit simplex.
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Equivalent conditions are assumed in prior work on multinomial choice by, e.g., Matzkin (1993) , Lewbel (2000) , and Briesch, Chintagunta, and Matzkin (2005) . Such an assumption provides a natural benchmark for exploring identi…ability under ideal conditions. However, we will also explore results that do not require this assumption in section 6.
Without Assumption 1, we will require instrumental variables. Let
jt , where x (1) jt 2 R K denotes the endogenous characteristics. We then let w jt x
jt ;w jt denote the vector of exogenous conditioning variables. We will consider two alternative sets of instrumental variables conditions below, each taken from the recent literature on nonparametric instrumental variables regression.
22 This is only "essentially" required by the large support condition because we do not require continuity of choice probabilities in z 
Identi…cation with Fully Independent Instruments
We …rst explore identi…cation using instrumental variables conditions from Chernozhukov and Hansen (2005) . We normalize jt j2J by assuming that for each j, jt has a uniform marginal distribution on (0; 1). Here we will assume x (1) jt is continuously distributed, with conditional density function f x j x (1) jt jw jt . 23 We will condition on a value of x
1t ; : : : ; x
Jt , suppress these arguments in the notation, and let x jt now denote x (1) jt . De…ne the random variable
and let f j ( jx jt ; w jt ) denote its conditional density.
Let and f be some small positive constants. For each j and 2 (0; 1) de…ne L j ( ) as the convex hull of functions m j ( ; ) that satisfy (a) for all w jt , Pr ( jt m j (x jt ; ) jw jt ) 2 [ ; + ]; and
We now make the following instrumental variables assumptions, taken from Chernozhukov and Hansen (2005, Appendix C).
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Assumption 4. jt j= (w jt ; z ijt ) 8j; t:
Assumption 5. For all j and 2 (0; 1), (i) for any bounded function B j (x; ) = m j (x; )
(ii) the density f " j (ejx; w) of jt is continuous and bounded in e over R a.s.;
Assumption 4 is a strong exclusion restriction requiring fully independent instruments.
Assumption 5 is a particular type of "bounded completeness" condition, requiring that the 23 This could be dropped by appealing below to Theorems 2 and 3 (and the associated rank conditions) in Chernozhukov and Hansen (2005) instead of their Theorem 4. We focus on continuous endogenous characteristics here because price is our leading example. 24 Chernozhukov and Hansen's "rank invariance" property holds here because the same unobservable jt determines potential values of jt for all possible values of the endogenous characteristics.
As in their framework, jt and x jt can be assumed without loss to be tranformed to have bounded support. instruments induce su¢ cient variation in the endogenous variables. This condition plays the role of the standard rank condition for linear models, but for the nonparametric nonseparable model j = D j (x; ).
25 With these assumptions, we obtain the following result.
Theorem 2. Under the representation of preferences in (5), suppose Assumptions 3-5 hold.
Then each jt and the joint distribution of fv ijt g j2J conditional on any (x jt ; z ijt ; jt ) j2J in their support is identi…ed.
Proof. Let ijt = j x jt ; jt ; ! it and observe that
Holding t …xed, ijt j= z ijt , so Assumption 3 guarantees identi…cation of the marginal distribution of ijt jt for each j. This implies identi…cation of the conditional median jt = med j x jt ; jt ; ! it jx jt ; jt = med j x jt ; jt ; ! it jt :
Thus, the left side of (9) can be treated as known for all j and t. Noting that the function D j in (9) must be strictly increasing in jt , Theorem 4 of Chernozhukov and Hansen (2005) then implies that under Assumptions 4 and 5, each function D j (and therefore each jt ) is identi…ed. Finally, observe that for any market t p i0t = Pr (z i1t + i1t 0; : : : ; z iJt + iJt 0j t; z i1t ; : : : ; z iJt )
= Pr ( i1t z i1t ; : : : ; iJt z iJt j t; z i1t ; : : : ; z iJt ) so that Assumption 3 implies identi…cation of the joint distribution of ( i1t ; : : : ; iJt ) jt.
Since each x jt is observed and each jt is identi…ed, this implies identi…cation of the joint distribution of ( i1t ; : : : ; iJt ) conditional on any (x jt ; z ijt ; jt ) j2J in their support. Since v ijt = z ijt + ijt , the result follows.
Our proof exploits the large support condition wherever possible, including in an "identi…cation at in…nity"argument (equation (10)) often employed in this literature (e.g., Matzkin (1993) ). However, we will show below that demand is identi…ed without this assumption, and that even full identi…cation is robust to relaxation of the support assumption. However, if we are willing to impose additional structure on the utility function, we can utilize a somewhat more intuitive suf…cient condition for full identi…cation. Doing so also enables us to relax the excludability restriction to require only mean independence.
Conditioning on x
(2) t as in the prior section, suppose (for this subsection only) that each consumer i's conditional indirect utilities can be represented as
where it and it are strictly positive with probability one and the expectations E [ it ],
, and E ~ j (x jt ; ! it ) jx jt are …nite. This imposes a restriction relative to (5) but is 26 See also Berry and Haile (2009a) , which does not use an identi…cation at in…nity argument even for full identi…cation. 27 In Berry and Haile (2009a) we explore an alternative argument relying on classical exclusion and support conditions in an environment combining discrete choice demand with a partially speci…ed model of supply. still quite general relative to the prior literature. A representation of preferences equivalent to (13) is v ijt = z ijt + j x jt ; jt ; ! it 8i; j = 1; : : : ; J
where now
Here we also use a di¤erent normalization of jt . Instead of letting jt have a standard uniform distribution, we make the location normalization
and scale normalization
Both are without further loss of generality.
With this structure we can replace the full independence assumption (Assumption 4) with mean independence.
Assumption 6. E jt jw jt ; z ijt = 0 8j; t;w jt ; z ijt .
To show identi…cation of the joint distribution of fv ijt g j2J conditional on x jt ; z ijt ; jt j2J , …rst note that the marginal distribution of j x jt ; jt ; ! it jt for each j is identi…ed using the same argument used in the …rst lines of the proof of Theorem 2. This implies identi…cation of the conditional means jt E j x jt ; jt ; ! it t for all j and t. With the separable structure (15) and the normalization (16), for each j and t we have
for some unknown function D j . It is then straightforward to con…rm that, under Assumption 6, the following "completeness"condition is necessary and su¢ cient for identi…cation of each function D j from observation of ( jt ; x jt ;w jt ) (Newey and Powell (2003) ).
Assumption 7. For all j and all functions B j (x jt ) with …nite expectation,
The completeness condition is the analog of the standard rank condition for identi…ability in linear models. Like the standard rank condition, completeness requires that variation in w ijt induce su¢ cient variation in x
(1) jt to distinguish the true function D j ( ) from other functions of x (1) jt using the conditional mean restriction of Assumption 6. 28 We can now state a second full identi…cation result for the multinomial choice model. 
Identi…cation of Demand Using Limited Support
The large support assumption (Assumption 3) in the preceding section is common in the literature but is obviously strong. Although our results describe only su¢ cient conditions for identi…ability, it should not be surprising that a large support assumption may be needed for full identi…cation of the random utility model: if the exogenous observables can move choice probabilities only through a subset of the unit simplex, we should only hope to identify the joint distribution of utilities on a subset of their support. Of course, one would like to understand how heavily the results rely on the tails of the large support and what can be learned from more limited variation. We explore these questions here.
We show that more limited variation can be su¢ cient to identify demand, i.e., to identify the unobservables jt and the structural choice probabilities j fx jt ; jt ; z ijt g j2J at all points of support. We also show continuity of the identi…ed features with respect to the support of the micro data. In particular, moving from our limited support condition to the large support condition moves the identi…ed features of the model smoothly toward the full identi…cation results of the preceding sections.
For multinomial choice we obtain these results under a somewhat more restrictive speci…cation of preferences than that in (5). Up to this quali…cation, however, these results should be a comforting. Demand is identi…ed without the large support condition. And although we require the large support for full identi…ability of the random utility model in the previous section, the identi…cation is not knife-edge: the tails of the large support are needed only to determine the tails of the joint distributions of utilities.
Binary Choice
Identi…cation of Demand
As before, we begin with binary choice to illustrate our main insights. We begin with the relaxed support condition on z it . We assume existence of one "common choice probability" that is attainable in each market t by the appropriate choice of z it .
Assumption 8. For some q 2 (0; 1), for each market t there exists a unique z q t 2supp z it such that Pr (y it = 1jz it = z q t ) = q.
This requires su¢ cient variation in z it to push the choice probability to q in each market, not over the whole interval (0; 1) in each market.
29 This is not innocuous but is much less demanding than the full support condition.
29 Implicitly we also require a continuous (region of) support for (x t ; t ; ! i ) jx t ; t to ensure uniqueness of each z q t .
Consumer i chooses the inside good if
Under Assumption 8, for each market t we can …nd the value z q t such that Pr ( (x t ; t ; ! it ) < z it jx t ; t ; z it )j z it =z q t = q:
Observe that each z q t is the qth quantile of the random variable (x t ; t ; ! it ) conditional on t, i.e., on (x t ; t ). Thus, we can write
for some function ( ; q) that is strictly decreasing in t . This strict monotonicity is the key idea here: holding x t …xed, markets with high values of z q t are those with low values of the unobservable t . Here we will revert to the uniform normalization of t .
Identi…cation of the function ( ; q) ; and therefore of each t ; then follows from (17) as in the preceding sections, using the nonparametric instrumental variables result of Chernozhukov and Hansen (2005) . This holds under the same type of bounded completeness assumption made in section 5.1; we state this condition formally as Assumption 12 in the Appendix. With each t known, the observable choice probabilities reveal the structural choice probabilities (x t ; t ; z it ) = Pr (y it = 1jx t ; t ; z it )
at all points (x t ; t ; z it ) of support. This gives the following result.
Theorem 4. In the binary choice model with preferences given by (5), suppose Assumptions 4, 8, and 12 hold. Then each t is identi…ed and the structural choice probabilities (x t ; t ; z it ) are identi…ed at all points (x t ; t ; z it ) in their support.
Continuity of the Identi…ed Features
Theorem 4 required only one common choice probability. If there is more than one, each provides additional information about the distribution of v it jx t ; z it ; t . In particular, we can identify a function ( ; q) in (17) for each common choice probability q, each then determining the qth quantile of (x t ; t ; ! it ) jx t ; t . Since v it = z it + (x t ; t ; ! it ), this determines the corresponding quantiles of the distribution of v it conditional on (x t ; t ; z it ). In the limiti.e., with su¢ cient variation in z it to make every q 2 (0; 1) a common choice probability-all quantiles of v it conditional on (x t ; t ; z it ) are identi…ed, and we are back to full identi…cation as in Theorem 2. This illustrates the notion of continuity of the identi…ed features described above. It also shows that we require the tails of fz ijt g j2J only to identify the tails of the conditional distributions of utilities.
Multinomial Choice
For multinomial choice we will require a di¤erent representation of preferences: 30 v ijt = j z ijt + jt ; x jt ; ! it 8i; j = 1; : : : ; J
where each j is strictly increasing in its …rst argument. This is similar to (13) in requiring that z ijt and jt be perfectly substitutable. Here we require all consumers to have the same marginal rate of substitution (normalized to one) between z ijt and jt , but allow the index z ijt + jt to enter the utility function in a fully nonparametric way. This restriction …xes the scale of each jt but not the locations. So we set E jt = 0 8j, leaving the marginal distributions of each jt otherwise unrestricted.
A key implication of (19) is that choice probabilities depend on the sums ijt z ijt + jt 30 Here we focus on identi…cation of demand. Continuity of the identi…ed features can be obtained as in the binary model if we have the separable structure z ijt + jt + j (x jt ; ! it ).
rather than on z ijt and jt separately. Thus, letting t = ( i1t ; : : : ; iJt ) and x t = (x 1t ; : : : ; x Jt ), we can write the structural choice probabilities as
For the multinomial choice model our results rely on invertibility of the mapping from the latent indexes t to the market shares implied by utility maximization. To show that this holds we require a weak notion of the choice set J being a set of substitute goods that "belong"in the same market. To state this "connected substitutes"condition, we …rst need a de…nition. De…nition 1. Product k substitutes to product`at ( t ; x t ) if `( t ; x t ) is strictly decreasing in ikt .
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This de…nition provides a natural directional notion of one product's being a substitute for another. For example, if a reduction in kt leads (all else equal) to a larger market share for product`, we say that product k substitutes to product`.
Given any values of ( t ; x t ), let (J ) denote the (J + 1) (J + 1) matrix of zeros and ones, with the (r; c) element equal to one if product (r 1) substitutes to product (c 1) at ( t ; x t ). We will assume that the products j 2 J all belong in the same choice set in the following sense.
Assumption 9 ("Connected Substitutes"). At any ( t ;x t ) such that ( 1 ( t ;x t ) ; : : : ; J ( t ;x t )) is on the interior of 4 J , the directed graph of (J ) is strongly connected.
The directed graph of (J ) has nodes (vertices) representing each product and an edge from product k to product`whenever product k substitutes to product`. 32 The "connected substitutes" condition requires that this graph include a directed path from every product 31 Because we introduce this de…nition after normalizing the utility of the outside good to zero, we de…ne an increase in i0t to mean equal reductions in ijt for all j > 0. Thus product 0 substitutes to product j if the probability good j is chosen goes up whenever ikt increases by an equal amount for all k > 0:
32 In standard models (J ) will typically be symmetric, so the edges of its directed graph will be bidirectional. j 2 J to every other product j 0 2 J . Of course, the path between j and j 0 may be through other nodes. Thus, for example, even a market with two independent goods satis…es this condition if both substitute to and from the outside good. On the other hand, if the connected substitutes condition fails, then there is some strict subset of J that substitute only among themselves for some values of ( t ;x t ). In Berry and Haile (2009a) we provide additional discussion of this condition and show that it is satis…ed in standard models. There we also point out that this condition is equivalent to a condition used by Gandhi (2008) to show invertibility of market shares. Using his argument, we can show the following result for our framework, generalizing well-known invertibility results for linear discrete choice models in Hotz and Miller (1993) , Berry (1994) and Berry and Pakes (2007) .
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Lemma 1. Consider any choice probability vector p = (p 1 ; : : : ; p J ) 0 on the interior of 4 J .
Under Assumption 9, for any x t there is at most one vector 2 R J such that j ( ; x t ) = p j for all j:
Proof. See Berry and Haile (2009a) , Lemma 1.
Finally, we generalize the previous common choice probability assumption in the natural way.
Assumption 10. There exists q = (q 0 ; q 1 ; : : : ; q J ) on the interior of 4 J such that for each market t there is a vector z q t = (z q 1t ; : : : ; z q 1t ) 2supp(z i1t ; : : : ; z iJtt ) such that for all j; q j = Pr(y it = j jx 1t ; : : : ; x Jt ; z i1t ; : : : ; z iJtt ) z it =z q t : Assumption 10 requires the vector (z i1t ; : : : ; z iJt ) have su¢ cient support to drive the choice probability vector to q in each market. The value of q satisfying this condition need not be known a priori, since this is observable. Indeed, the existence of the common choice 33 Berry (1994) and Berry and Pakes (2007) show existence and uniqueness of an inverse choice probability in models with an additive structure. Gandhi (2008) relaxes the separability requirement. Our lemma addresses only uniqueness conditional on existence. Under the maintained assumption that the model is correctly speci…ed, any observed choice probability vector must have a vector ( 1 ; : : : ; J ) that rationalizes it. Gandhi (2008) provides additional conditions guaranteeing that an inverse exists for every choice probability vector in 4 J . Our uniqueness result di¤ers from his only slightly, mainly in recognizing that the argument applies to a somewhat more general model of preferences.
probability is directly testable. This condition still requires su¢ ciently rich J-dimensional micro data; however, it is considerably weaker than the full support condition, which essentially required all points in 4 J to be common choice probabilities.
With the connected substitutes and common choice probability assumptions, we can show identi…cation of demand using the instrumental variables conditions of Newey and Powell (2003) .
Theorem 5. In the multinomial choice model with preferences given by (19), suppose Assumptions 6, 7, 9, and 10 hold. Then each jt is identi…ed and the structural choice probabilities j fx jt ; jt ; z ijt g j2J are identi…ed at all fx jt ; jt ; z ijt g j2J in their support.
Proof. Fix x t = (x 1t ; : : : ; x Jt ) and let q be the common choice probability vector. By
Assumption 10 and Lemma 1, there is a unique vector (x t ; q) = ( 1 (x t ; q) :; : : : ; J (x t ; q)) such that j ( (x t ; q) ; x t ) = q j 8j:
Further, by the de…nitions of z q t and j (x t ; q), j (x t ; q) = jt + z q jt , so that
Under Assumptions 6 and 7, the equations (20) identify the functions j ( ; q) and each jt for all j and t, using the identi…cation result in Newey and Powell (2003) for nonparametric regression with instrumental variables. As demonstrated above, knowledge of all jt identi…es the structural choice probability functions.
Note that, in contrast to the results in section 5, here the entire x t vector appears as an argument of the "regression"function j in (20). One implication is that characteristics of competing products are not available as instruments.
Testable Restrictions
The models we have considered incorporate several important maintained assumptions.
These include the existence of a vertical consumer-choice observable z ijt , the restriction to a scalar vertical market/choice-speci…c unobservable jt , and the invariance of jt to z it .
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Here we show that these assumptions imply testable restrictions. We begin with the existence of the vertical consumer-choice observable z ijt .
Remark 1. Suppose preferences can be characterized by (5), or by (19) with strictly increasing in its …rst argument. Then Pr (y it = jjt; fz ikt g k2J ) is increasing in z ijt :
This is immediate from the requirement that the utility from good j be strictly increasing in z ijt . Furthermore, it is clear that the restriction need not hold if utilities sometimes are decreasing in z ijt .
The assumption of a scalar vertical unobservable also leads to testable implications. For simplicity we show this here for binary choice. To state the result it will be useful to recall Theorem 4 and let t (z q t ; q; x t ) denote the value of t identi…ed from the common choice probability q in market t.
Remark 2. In the binary choice model with preferences given by (5), suppose Assumptions 4, 12, and 8 hold. Then t (z q t ; q; x t ) must be strictly decreasing in z q t across markets.
This follows from the fact that v it is strictly increasing in both z it and t under the assumptions of the model. Thus, the value z q t required to attain the common choice probability q in market t will be higher when the unobservable t is lower. The following example shows one way that a model with a horizontal rather than a vertical unobservable characteristic can lead to a violation of this restriction.
Example 2. Suppose (x t ; t ; it ) = it t , with it N(0; 1). Take q > 1=2 and consider the set of markets in which t (z q t ; q; x t ) > 0. Recall that each z q t is observable and is de…ned 34 Recall that z ijt and z it refer to the original z
ijt and z
it .
such that Pr ( it t < z q t ) = q. Letting denote the standard normal CDF, this requires
Therefore, by construction, z q t t will take the same value in every market. Since each z q t must also be positive when q > 1=2, this requires a strictly positive correspondence between z q t and t across markets, violating the restriction from Theorem 2.
The restriction in Remark 2 follows from the requirement of a vertical jt . Additional testable implications follow from the restriction to a scalar choice/market-speci…c unobservable jt that is invariant to z it : the values of jt inferred from any any two common choice probabilities must agree.
Remark 3. In the binary choice model with preferences given by (5), suppose Assumptions 4 and 12 hold. In addition, suppose q and q 0 are two common choice probabilities. Then
Proof. Under the assumptions of the model, t (z q t ; q; x t ) = t z q 0 t ; q 0 ; x t = t .
The following example demonstrates that this restriction can fail if the assumption of a scalar market/choice-speci…c unobservable is violated.
Example 3. Consider a model with two vertical unobservables, Without micro data, the observables are f(y it ; x jt )g j2J . Partition
and suppose preferences can be represented by conditional indirect utilities of the form
Assume further that the set of markets can be partitioned into market groups such that for all t 2 , x
(ii)
j ; j . One natural example of such an environment is that of a national industry (e.g., the U.S. automobile industry) in which the physical products themselves are identical across regions of the nation, but regions may di¤er in average income, product prices (e.g., due to f.o.b. pricing), prices of complementary goods (e.g., gasoline), availability of substitute goods (e.g., public transportation), etc.
For simplicity, we illustrate the argument only for the case of full identi…cation with exogenous product characteristics. However, all the identi…cation results obtained above have analogs in this setting. Here we require su¢ cient variation in a special product characteristic rather than a special consumer-product characteristic (cf. Assumption 3). Further, the notion of "market group" now replaces the notion of "market"in our original framework. Within each market group,
jt can now play the role of the "micro data." With this reinterpretation, the setup is isomorphic to that in section 5, and the prior arguments apply directly. Variation in x (i) jt across market groups at the limit x (ii)
, identi…cation of the function x
(ii) j ; j (and therefore each j ) follows exactly as in the previous sections. With each j and the distribution of i x
(ii) j ; j known, the conditional joint distribution of fv ijt g j2J J ; (x jt ; jt ) j2J is uniquely determined at any J ; (x jt ; jt ) j2J in their support.
Because the setup here is isomorphic to that for the original micro data setting, extensions to the case of endogenous characteristics (elements of x (ii) jt ), a separable error structure, and identi…cation of demand with limited support follow directly as well. 35 
Conclusion
We have studied nonparametric identi…cation of models of multinomial choice demand, allowing for market/choice-speci…c unobservables, endogenous choice characteristics, and arbitrary random heterogeneity across consumers in tastes for products and/or characteristics.
We obtained full identi…cation using the same kind of large support assumption used to show identi…cation in even the simplest semiparametric discrete choice models, and the same instrumental variables conditions required for identi…cation of nonparametric regres- 35 An interesting but unresolved question is what can be learned in a single market with a large choice set, i.e., with J ! 1 (see Berry, Linton, and Pakes (2004) ). Suppose that x jt does not include product dummies but preferences can still be represented by (5), imposing a symmetry condition that the same function apply to all products. Fixing a market with a …nite choice set, the market share of the outside good is p 0 = Pr z
i1 + (x 1 ; 1 ; ! it ) < 0; : : : ; z
iJ + (x J ; J ; ! it ) < 0 :
For any …nite J, a large support condition would give identi…cation of the joint distribution of ( (x 1 ; 1 ; ! it ) ; : : : ; (x J ; J ; ! it )), so that each j med x j ; j ; ! it jx j ; j could be considered known. As J ! 1 one would then obtain an arbitrarily good approximation of the joint distribution of ( j ; x j ). If this joint distribution were instead known, the fact that j = D x j ; j would allow identi…cation of D from the results of Chernozhukov and Hansen (2005) . Identi…cation of demand and full identi…cation would then follow. sion models. Further, the results rely on the large support only for identi…cation of tail probabilities, whereas identi…cation of demand holds under a signi…cantly weaker support condition. This is particularly encouraging given the su¢ ciency of the demand structure for many questions motivating estimation of discrete choice demand models.
While one goal of our work has been to obtain results with few restrictions on preferences, there are some costs to a choice not to place more structure on the form of utility functions.
One is that some types of counterfactuals will not be identi…able. An example is demand for a hypothetical product with characteristics outside their support in the data generating process. This kind of limitation is not special to our setting, but inherent to empirical analysis: extrapolation and interpolation typically require some parametric structure. Of course, one may have more con…dence in extrapolations when identi…cation holds nonparametrically within the support of the observables.
A second limitation concerns welfare. Our model (5) incorporates quasilinear preferences.
This provides a speci…cation of cardinal utility that can be used to characterize changes in utilitarian social welfare (in aggregate, or across subpopulations de…ned by observables) 36 or changes in welfare under any social welfare function that is anonymous conditional on observables. However, our model lacks the structure required for welfare analysis that depends on the distribution of changes in individual utilities. Characterization of Pareto improvements, for example, would require tracking each individual consumer's position in the distribution of utilities before a policy change to that after. Our model speci…es a distribution of conditional indirect utilities, not a distribution of parameters whose realizations can be associated with individual consumers. This points out a limitation of nonparametric random utility models as a theoretical foundation for some kinds of welfare analysis: such welfare calculations require additional a priori structure. 36 The quasilinearity generally will not be in income, but one can describe changes in aggregate compensating/equivalent variation in units of the normalized marginal utility for z (1) ijt . Income (and/or price) will typically enter preferences through the function in (5). The potential nonlinearity of , combined with our inability to track individuals'positions in the distributions of normalized utilities as the choice environment varies, prevents characterization of aggregate compensating variation or equivalent variation in income units. One could address this limitation with an assumption that v ijt is linear in price. Further, in Berry and Haile (2009a) we provide conditions under which quasilinearity in price can replace quasilinearity in z ijt .
An example of a model with su¢ cient structure to address all types of welfare questions (and to extrapolate/interpolate) is the linear random coe¢ cients random utility model (Example 1)
This generates a special case of our model, so we have provided conditions for identi…cation of jt j2J and the joint distribution of fv ijt g j2J j x jt ; jt ; z ijt j2J . However, it should be clear that the joint distribution of ( it ; i1t ; : : : ; iJt ) is not identi…ed without additional restrictions. 37 Moving from our full identi…cation results to identi…cation of the distribution of parameters in (23) is equivalent to the standard problem of identi…cation of a linear random coe¢ cients regression model. Beran and Hall (1992) and Beran, Feuerverger, and Hall (1996) have discussed su¢ cient conditions, which involve regularity and support requirements beyond those required for our results. Whether pursuing this line of argument enables any relaxation of existing identi…cation results for linear random coe¢ cients models (e.g., Ichimura and Thompson (1998), Briesch, Chintagunta, and Matzkin (2005) , Gautier and Kitamura (2007) ) is an open question.
Finally, while a novel aspect of our work is its examination of identi…cation without large support conditions, even our weaker "common choice probability" condition requires J-dimensional micro data. One can easily imagine applications where this will not be available. In the extreme, when no micro data are available, one is in the case of marketlevel data, and we explore that setting in Berry and Haile (2009a) . Whether the su¢ cient conditions for identi…cation there could be relaxed in intermediate cases-where there is some micro data, but of a lower dimension than that of the choice set-is an interesting question for future work.
37 For any true model with the form (23), an observationally equivalent model is obtained by setting it = = 0 and letting the joint distribution of ( i1t ; : : : ; iJt ) jfx jt ; z ijt ; jt g j2J equal that of (v i1t 1t ; : : : ; v iJt Jt ) jfx jt ; z ijt ; jt g j2J .
